Monday, March 30, 2009

Wikileaks:Re-post

Western internet censorship: The beginning of the end or the end of the beginning?
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March 29, 2009

EDITORIAL (WikiLeaks)

We're arresting you for speeding.
What's the speed limit officer?
The speed limit is secret.

Cathy Wilcox
Cathy Wilcox

Shortly after 9pm on Tuesday March 24, Wikileaks related buildings in Dresden and Jena, were raided by 11 plain clothes German police.

Why?

Over the last two years, Wikileaks has exposed detailed secret government censorship lists or plans for over eight countries, including Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, Australia, and Germany.

Although Wikileaks' main site has been censored by the Chinese Public Security Bureau since early 2007, last week saw the site placed onto a secret list of sites "forbidden" by the Australian Media and Communications Authority, or ACMA.

The pro-censorship governments exposed by Wikileaks can be divided into three broad categories:

1. Countries with a mandatory censorship system in place: Thailand, the UAE, and Lebanon (films).
2. Countries proposing a mandatory censorship system: Australia and Germany.
3. Countries in which the internet censorship system is an unregulated agreement between several large ISPs and the police: Norway, Denmark and Finland.

Australia and Germany are the only liberal democracies proposing a mandatory internet censorship regime.

All of the schemes operate, or are proposed to operate, through multi-million dollar national networks of censorship machines.

The machines spy on the nation as each citizen attempts to read on the internet, and compares requested pages to those listed on a secret government "blacklist".

If the page is on the blacklist, the government forcibly prevents the citizen from viewing the information by intercepting his or her internet communication and diverting it to a machine controlled by the censorship system. This machine is often configured to record the identity of the person attempting to access the forbidden information. If the page is not on the blacklist, the government grants permission for the citizen to view the page.

Although originally marketed, in all countries, as a way of combating child pornography, the blacklists obtained by Wikileaks show that the systems have already been corrupted into censoring other content, including political content.

For instance, the secret blacklist for Thailand censors thousands of sites per year deemed to be critical of the Thai Monarchy, from academic books and YouTube to the Economist magazine and Wikileaks itself.

Similarly, the blacklist for Australia contains an anti-abortion site, fringe religions, a dentist clinic, gay sites, gambling sites, islamist sites, euthanasia activist sites, an astrologer's blog, misclassified material, and, like Thailand, Wikileaks itself. Even the Australian government's "Minister for censorship", Senator Stephen Conroy, has admitted that fully half of the sites on the secret list are unrelated to child pornography.

As newspapers and other publications migrate to an exclusive life on the internet, such totalizing censorship systems are able to instantly snatch "pages" from the laps of citizens across an entire nation, interdicting communications between publisher and reader, and the new civil discourse between readers and each other. The scale, speed and potential impact of this centralized intervention has no historical precedent.

Secret national censorship systems are dangerous and unaccountable. They are an afront to natural justice, due process and the balancing power of the fourth estate. They must be, and will be, stopped.

The Australian Government has stated it plans to increase the size of its blacklist list by 10 fold, from roughly 1,200 blocked pages to over 10,000, although the plan is now seems unlikely to pass the Australian Senate after the revelations of the last month.
* * * * *

To make what has happened clear to those who understand traditional book censorship, we provide the following simple analogy:

Within the libraries and book catalogues of Germany and Australia there are books (web pages) forbidden by the state.

The government of Australia has compiled a secret list of books it forbids. About 1,200 books are on the list.

Not even authors or publishers whose books are placed on the list are told their book has been banned.

Germany plans to adopt and expand a version of the Australian scheme.

Under the plans of the German and Australian governments, every attempt to borrow a book (read a web page) will be checked against the secret "forbidden books" (forbidden web pages) list.

If a book is on the list, the attempt to borrow it is noted down in another secret list and permission is refused. If the book is not on the blacklist, permission is granted.

The list of forbidden books (the blacklist) is a forbidden book.

The lists of books forbidden in other countries are also forbidden books.

Any book that mentions the title (URL) of a forbidden book is itself a forbidden book.

An international investigative newspaper (Wikileaks) reveals key internal documents on the censorship expansion plans for Germany, Australia and other countries. For Australia this expose includes the lists of forbidden books and the presence of clearly political books on the list. The newspaper warns that Australia is acting like a "democratic backwater" and risks following the censorship path of Thailand.

The article and lists, and then the entire newspaper secretly added to the list of publications banned by Australia.

The Australian "Minister for censorship", Senator Stephen Conroy, states "Any citizen who distributes [the blacklist] is at serious risk of criminal prosecution". The Minister threatens to refer the leak to the Australian Federal Police.

That same week, the newspaper releases three more articles on censorship and updates the lists of forbidden books.

Two buildings related to the newspaper in Germany are then raided by 11 plain clothed police. The police demand the keys (passwords) to a protected room (server) containing the newspaper's printing press so they can disable it. The newspaper staff refuse to comply--both the keys and the press itself have been sent to Sweden, a country with stronger legal protections for journalists.

The German police then seize what they believe to be the newspaper's archives (a hardrive) and a typewriter (laptop) "for evidence".

* * * * *

The story might end there, but 12 hours after the police raid, on Wednesday the 25th of March, the German Cabinet announced the completion of a proposed law for a nationwide, mandatory censorship system--to be pushed through before national elections in September, 2009.

For every noble human desire, in this case, the strong protective feelings most adults have towards children, opportunists such as Senator Conroy and his German equivalent, CDU Minister Ursula von der Leyen, stand ready to exploit these feelings for their own power and position.

Von der Leyen apparently hopes to raise her profile before a national election by promoting a national censorship "solution" to child pornography.

But forcibly preventing the average parent from seeing evidence of what may be an abuse against a child is not the same as stopping abuses against children. Absense of evidence is not evidence of absense.

Censoring the evidence promotes abuses by driving them underground, where they are difficult to track. Such schemes divert resources and political will away from proven policing solutions which target producers and consumers.

Children depend, even more than their parents, on the quality and viability of government. An assault against those systems and ideals which keep government honest and accountable - public oversight, natural justice, and protection from state censorship - is not just an affront to Enlightment ideals, but an assult on the long term interests of children and adults alike.

The March 24th raid is not the first time the German state has attempted to censor Wikileaks; back in December 2008, Ernst Uhrlau, former police chief and current head of the BND, Germany's equivalent to the CIA, threatened to prosecute the site unless it removed a BND dossier on corrupt officials in Kosovo and other information. The dossier was not removed. There is no evidence that the police action and the BND incident are related, but the situation, together with a recent Bundestag inquiry documenting illegal BND spying on the German press, does not paint a flattering picture of the state of German government.

The Plan

From: http://soli.inav.net/~catalyst/Humor/plan.htm

In the beginning was the Plan.

And then came the Assumptions.

And the assumptions were without form.

And the plan was without substance.

And darkness was upon the faces of the workers.

And they spoke among themselves saying, "It is a crock of shit and it stinks."

And the workers went unto their Supervisors and said, "It is a pail of dung and we cannot live with the smell."

And the supervisors went unto their Managers saying, "It is a container of organic waste and it is very strong such that none may abide by it."

And the managers went unto their Directors, saying, "It is a vessel of fertilizer and none may abide by it."

And the Directors spoke among themselves, saying to one another, "It contains that which aids plant growth and it is very powerful."

And the Vice Presidents went to the President, saying unto him, "This new plan will actively promote growth and vigor of the company with very powerful effects."

And the president looked upon the plan and saw that it was good.

And the plan became Policy.

And this is how shit happens.

Friday, March 27, 2009

FEAR

Maybe you're right and I should play it safe and not express myself.

I don't think you understand what or where my mind is moving to... or the construct in which everyone is trapped. FEAR.

I'm sick to death of being sick to death of some 'future', playing it safe and bending to this future you speak of.

I am a good person, that's all anyone needs to know. My intent is honorable. Fuck em' fuck em all.

Now I am going to sleep. I think your concern is nice but misplaced, you need to try and understand fully and more deeply what you are afraid of on my behalf, what construct it is, why it scares you and not me....... and this is Donal the geek who can probably see further and faster than most in to the 'future'.

I appreciate your concern, however I will stand by my instinct and convictions.

I repeat. Fuck em' , fuck em' all, I don't want a part in any future that doesn't want a part of me. All of me. Do you understand now?

I can't live my life afraid or in fear. If it doesn't work, I will create my own reality or find others that share MY reality. Ask yourself what you are afraid of and then use the past to project a different future.

Thursday, March 26, 2009

Questions for Conroy

#nocleanfeed #censorship #wikileaks



With props to Dan Geer's essay on Convergence.

Sunday, March 22, 2009

Web X.0:Faith:Vision:Life:Laughs:Remix

Title:The Web and TV, a sibling rivalry...

Mandate from the masses

Censorship:Getup.org.au:Children

Dear Tim/Getup re: http://www.getup.org.au/campaign/SaveTheNet&id=576

**** How about toddlers speaking with adult voices, with plain white backgrounds engaging in critical free speech and educational paradigms? ****

Won't someone think of the children? Well has anyone actually asked them about the internet and bad stuff? It's their future, not ours. Maybe you have a baby or child and each iteration of generation ~ 10-15 years speaks with the voice of a generation 20-25 years older? Then a very old person speaking with a toddlers voice to complete the circle and enforce the concept.

When you apply reductionist thought akin to 'give a man a fish, he'll eat for a day, teach a man to fish and you have fed him for a lifetime', unfettered access to information which provokes critical thought and enforces personal and parental responsibility is paramount. Privacy, identity, global networks with no geo-political boundaries, censorship, free speech, autodidactic education, decentralism, human organisation, publishing, commerce, literacy, all salient and prominent issues... we need to get toddlers/kids to speak on their own, and our behalf.. it will also provoke thought and positive/negative publicity to catapult this topic in to the pscyche of this fledgling nation.

As @Wadeis pointed out many moons ago a viral video "akin" to this *will* work.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=AU&hl=en-GB&v=0vtHwWReGU0 , albeit I see kids speaking with adult voices about important memes. Perhaps sound bytes from both sides of the debate from prominent opponents/proponents?

We need some public faces/voices and simple messaging. We need to leverage existing memes while creating a new one.

Additional:
I have been collecting internet history/safety information videos on your behalf: http://bsdosx.blogspot.com/2009/02/histornet-history-of-internet.html , for any historical or future references as unfortunately a lot of this is underpinned by technology that changes the playing field.

Thursday, March 19, 2009

Internets

I spent a lot of time at the weekend talking about how information,
ideas, awareness and cirtical thought spreads; and it's all about
unfettered access and freedom/transparency of information(and/or
non-contextualised raw data).

Information pollution/signal to noise ratios are required as both a
contrast and training mechanism e.g. duality. The internet is the
largest human mirror and 'community of practice' we know. The ultimate
'connected' neural net.

Warts and all.

Fun eco links:
http://www.thecoolhunter.com.au/
http://www.inhabitat.com/

Monday, March 16, 2009

Back to my roots

cassawarie-daintree-09



So you know you're entering fun new territory when you see signs like this for Cassawaries!! I was heading in to one of the oldest jungles in the world for a weekend off the grid. Welcome to the Daintree


daves-house-daintree


This is Dave's house. Note the solar panels on the roof. Water is running straight from one of the creeks. We swam in many of the non-croc infested creeks, hung out on beaches with sea-eagles, checked out the mangrove flora and fauna.. and sampled the Wine Doctors resveratrol enhanced wine all while eating local produce and muggins here being introduced to fruit that tasted like creme caramel (called Abiu[s]).

Many of the worlds problems were solved this weekend in Cape Tribulation; however, as the solutions weren't documented in the moment, they have unfortunately been lost to mankind. I will have to go back up soon and chill wit' da junglists once more. Cheers Dave and Sarah...

Friday, February 27, 2009

Histornet : History and Future of the Internet



Then go here for "Warriors of the Net" for a fun view of some constituent parts:



Then go here for "A Common Sense Approach to Internet Safety":



And when you're finally ready, then go here for the future (38mins in is good!):

Monday, February 09, 2009

10 laws of networking (Donal)

Remember a few simple paradigms
===============================
1) The risk profile of a network or fabric is greater than the aggregate of the risk profiles for each of its endpoint/client connected nodes or services.
2) Never underestimate physical *and* logical separation. Ask yourself what happens if the mgmt control plane goes down or gets stuck in 'flipmode'?
3) Protect your management and control plane above all else, try not to have them in-path with the data plane. IT is change management, if you can't manage your resources, you may as well not have them.
4) Where are your policy enforcement points which facilitate auditability and visibility? AAA is a must!
5) Always use subnets and NETBLOCKs to separate traffic when you can. [e.g. use good address management] QOS on subnets is easier than QOS on discrete flows.
6) Darkness is not good. Instrument and gather telemetry from your network. Inbound poll and outbound trap at a minimum. Baselining and trending helps.
7) Always look at logs, sessions and empirical data rather than listening to conjecture and hearsay.
8) Abstraction layers are a good thing such that logical resources and physical resources can move without affecting one another. Loose coupling not tight coupling is the order of the day.
9) Always use loopbacks or virtual interfaces to manage devices where possible. [see 8]
10) In-path tests are the only things that represent what a client or endpoint sees. Up isn't always up, sometimes it's down.

Note: This is evolving, please leave comments on adds, moves, and changes... including priorities!

4 Laws of Troubleshooting:
==========================
1) Get, define, refine PROBLEM STATEMENT and the 5 WHY's.
2) Always go back to basics and first principles.
3) Look for commonalities and deltas.
4) Document an end-to-end code/firmware matrix for your problem.

Hugo's take on things (Not that I specifically disagree, but I do have a slightly variying point of view to the previously released laws)
========================================

1. Lack of visibility does not constitute lack of activity. While being unable to manage a device constitutes a significant risk, it does not constitute an outage.
2. We spend a great deal of time building highly available data paths in networks. They constitute one of the most reliable ways to get around the network. It is a valid consideration for the carriage of management traffic.
3. In a redundant, highly available network, a down device does not constitute a disaster, in fact, it doesn't even constitute an outage. Delaying its recovery constitutes a risk, not a problem.
4. The weakest part of your management is your people and processes, think less technically and more simply. Sometimes an analogue phone is the best solution.
5. Focus your efforts on the areas you have problems. Management like to see rapid improvement, don't focus on what causes you 1 issue a month to the detriment of something causing you 10.
6. Before you ring for escalation support, type "show log". Or look at the appropriate logs on the device or host.
7. History is important. Nothing changes radically overnight, if you can see what has happened before, you will know better whether you are looking at a one off event or a re-occurring issue. Many other pointers come from history and trending information.
8. No matter how big a nuffer they are, the day to day or other incident staff may well have seen something important that they can tell you. Try to establish the information behind their assumptions.
9. Best practice is merely something that worked for others. Sometimes our differences necessitate divergence. The best German engineering software in the world is of little value to someone who only speaks English. The best network management software in the world adds little value if it does not gather call history and quality information on your VoIP network. Best practice is a great starting point, but usually not where you should end up.
10. Keep it simple. Networks have a way of complicating themselves, your efforts should be towards keeping it simple and reliable.

Sunday, February 01, 2009

The coming global Infosec freeze

Our biggest problem is we can't demonstrate shit happens effectively enough. [Outcomes]
Especially when it get's rolled up in to operational 'stability' or the 80% of self serving retards running IT suppress ripples in the space time continuum. Or the snake-oil selling vendors manage to introduce more nodes and code rather than less.

Baselines and reference points are also missing, and we all know why. We're all using the same virtual bricks but building everything from lego turing machines to traffic systems to flying machines and fighting robots.

Google just did a lot of work for us classifying *everything* on the web as evil. So maybe we can just convince the web 2.0 fanatics to go join the luddites and take part in Donal's solution called....

.... wait for it....

"SLOW IT DOWN" I am now declaring a change freeze on all production systems till 2012 when we can get our shit together :)

Sunday, January 11, 2009

Filtering in Oz: Australia's Foray into Internet Censorship

I cannot recommend this independent paper enough! It's from the Brooklyn Law School.

S.Korean mirror: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1319466_code865180.pdf?abstractid=1319466&mirid=4



"Abstract: Australia's decision to implement Internet censorship using technological means creates a natural experiment: the first Western democracy to mandate filtering legislatively, and to retrofit it to a decentralized network architecture. But are the proposed restrictions legitimate? The new restraints derive from the Labor Party's pro-filtering electoral campaign, though coalition government gives minority politicians considerable influence over policy. The country has a well-defined statutory censorship system for on-line and off-line material that may, however, be undercut by relying on foreign and third-party lists of sites to be blocked. While Australia is open about its filtering goals, the government's transparency about what content is to be blocked is poor. Initial tests show that how effective censorship is at filtering prohibited content - and only that content - will vary based on what method the country's ISPs use. Though Australia's decisionmakers are formally accountable to citizens, efforts to silence dissenters, outsourcing of blocking decisions, and filtering's inevitable transfer of power to technicians undercut accountability. The paper argues Australia represents a shift by Western democracies towards legitimating Internet filtering and away from robust consideration of the alternatives available to combat undesirable information."

Relinked.

Wednesday, December 31, 2008

More doom?

a) 1974 http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/protection/

and

b) SecurityMetrics mailing list going round in circles.....

including

c) "It'll be just as insecure as it possibly can, while still continuing to function."
http://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/point-counterpoint/homeusers.htm

One does worry.

Until we can elicit a value to shared and dedicated nodes/messages + the organisational superorganism as a whole, risk and the quantification thereof is a joke.... unfortunately shared infrastructure and services such as routing/DNS/SNMP/NTP/logging *are* business critical e.g. data and control planes including management control planes. http://twitter.com/irldexter/status/1087480944

Here's to 2009! And some standardisaiton of code development and testing including liability etc as per David Rice's arguments in Geekonomics. http://my.safaribooksonline.com/9780321477897

Peace.

Security Absurdity from Ranum

Saturday, December 27, 2008

Aussie Filtering Meme

Gridlock 09': what do you think happens when every car is searched on the information superhighway?

Note: potentialy breath testing on the freeway, what do you think will happen?
NoteII: can use trucks, cars, buses and motorbikes to refer to packets/QOS etc.
NoteIII: easily accessible meme... 87% speed limit reduction on motorways for everyone..
NoteIIII: Australia, going nowhere fast.
NoteIIIII: Australia = Auto-BAN!

Sunday, December 21, 2008

Cavity searches and Internet Filtering

Proxying and tunnels will always get around filters. Full stop. I do not support censorship. Full stop. I do not support child pornography. Full stop. If child pornography was served from static webservers it would be easy to pull down. Full stop. There are 65,535 usable tcp ports. There are 65,535 usable udp ports. There are ~4 billion usable IP addresses spread around different regions on the planet and advertised by different Autonomous Systems.

However some thoughts.

a) From a Cisco perspective on a CRS/SSG/SCE, a thousand+ line ACL and Policy Map that routes requests for certain IP addresses to 'null 0' or sets the next hop for traffic to a logging/404 host would be feasible at peering edges. Feasible. As would a live feed akin to the Team Cymru dynamic bogon and martian feed. Feasible but very dangerous to centralise such dynamic control. One could also insert better prefixed /32 routes on the fly, akin to 'clean pipes' solutions that sinkhole and try to scrub distributed denial of service attacks.

The above points in (a) are equally achievable with Juniper high end gear also... and probably others too.

b) Any appliance/blade based content filtering or 'inline/OOB' IDS(Intrusion Detection System) will result in an epic fail; as opponents could shunt bad packets and malformed/obfuscated http gets at the device from multiple shifting sources all day and night to bring it to its knees! (Unless it only runs a DST IP block list...) There would also be massive issues with scaling and redundancy for most ISPs, let alone power and space constraints.

Both of the above techniques with the exception perhaps of the Null routing option for option(a) would allow one to reverse engineer the list with web spidering and/or large scale scanning.

c) AHTCC(Australian High Tech Crime Centre) and AFP(Australian Federal Police); if they are aware of known IP source addresses of 'kiddie porn', should already be looking for these traffic flows via a form of (a) that only provides them logging e.g. fully honors the traffic request and then subsequently investigate which Australian devices have sent said illegal requests via standard process. Unfortunately there can be issues with malware and establishment of identity/intent, however subsequent forensic investigations on offending hard-disks *should* confirm innocence or guilt (though costly to pursue as most good investigations are). If the list of DST IP addresses was leaked, miscreants could play havoc with the authorities through spoofing requests from local ISP IP addresses e.g. valid local SRC ranges(which an ISP cannot filter), and/or use botnets on Australian networks to achieve denial of service. Devices would have to fail open.

If logging was bidirectional then both inbound requests to Australian hosted content and requests to external countries would be enumerated. Unfortunately one could only effectively begin with IP's reported to authorities as any form of deeper content inspection would facilitate issues and abuses mentioned in (b).

Essentially, as with real world crime, one issue encountered is sometimes to balance the benefit of blocking or pre-empting an ongoing 'crime', with the possible information garnered by passively monitoring and going for the 'crimebosses' or actual perpetrators. This is a tough topic. No one is suggesting child pornography is a victimless crime, however are we going after paedophiles or trying to block what kids *might* see?

I do not support censorship. I am across LI(Legal Interception) in mobile/PSTN and data networks somehwhat and one should have warrants to actively tap citizens communications based upon probable cause. If one can prove that an IP address serves or accesses child pornography individuals should be prosecuted as per the judicial system. Unfortunately filtering *all* flows is a slippery slope, especially for those that control the blacklist(s).

d) How does one vet content and keep the IP addresses in (a) up-to-date and based upon what criteria? This can be especially difficult when recent research found that 69.8% of the websites for .com, .org and .net domains shared an IP address with 50 or more other websites. Such that a device served illegal content from a fixed IP, the content would be brought down very quickly by the authorities in the hosting country once that country had laws governing hosting of said content.

e) DNS poisoning = epic fail. Go direct to IP. Do not pass go. Do not collect $200.

I do not support child pornography. I do not support censorship. I do not support wasting millions of tax payers hard earned money on a fallacy.

I support law enforcement that works. I support the AHTCC and AFP. I support democracy. I do not support strip searching everyone that enters and leaves the country. I do not support all phone calls being tapped for illegal seditious conversations. I do not support our mail service opening every one of our letters. What are we doing about child pornography being physically mailed around in hardcopy or encrypted on USB thumb drives in the regular mail, or is that too hard?

And yes I am having seditious thoughts.

Cyberlaw, cybercops and cyber-democracy are required for cyberspace. Not cyber kid gloves and cyber sledge hammers.

Saturday, December 06, 2008

Some light relief?

I might get in trouble for this with the natives but I love this guy. Protect the kids from predators but that's about it. Industrial schooling, FUCK YOU SOCIETY!

Read Summerhill and grow. Link to website here: http://www.summerhillschool.co.uk/

Build more tubes for Australian Censorship!

Wordle.net tres-cool-super-sexy


"Wordle is a toy for generating “word clouds” from text that you provide. The clouds give greater prominence to words that appear more frequently in the source text."

This is my wordle of this blog.

Tuesday, November 18, 2008

Arrogance of obfuscation.

http://spittoon.23andme.com/2008/08/29/labs-remove-genetic-data-from-public-databases-after-forensic-breakthrough/#more-1174

"a new statistical method that can establish the presence of a single
individual's genetic signature in a sample containing DNA from
hundreds of different people."

"It was previously assumed that aggregating the data of hundreds or
even thousands of people — essentially giving the overall genetic
composition of the group as a whole — would make it impossible to
identify any one person in it."

"Hypothetical scenarios aside, it is highly unlikely that any person
has ever actually been picked out of an aggregate database, and not
just because the mathematics of the new method are so complex."

I sometimes worry more about DNA being 'stored' and derivitive
contextual information and the associated information security thereof
rather than any credit card data etc. This is prompted by a great new
service https://www.23andme.com/

In the future when a genomic representation of me can be anywhere and
stored in multiple locations, how do I asert that I am me.

The biometric system *must* be ensured to be localised and not
connected to any other networks... erm a bit like SCADA systems I hear
you say? Will we need an X point check system.. something I have,
know, macro am, micro am, quantum am, how Y is done/performed, how Z
is done/performed, how K is done/performed..

Fun: I spoke before about nanobots, I now present "nano-identbots"
which are like mayflies i.e. they die once they identify a host and
have a localised PGP relationship with the system with which identify
is supposed to be represented to. They generate keys on birth and
immediately go out to identify the subject etc...

Strategy and IT Architecture

Greenfields accommodates top down thinking.
Legacy constraints force the dichotomoy of top down and bottom up, for the devil is in the detail!

Thursday, November 06, 2008

Had to re-post this. I love it.



This is very like Open University or BBC2 programs for schools. Wonderful sardonic stuff!

Tuesday, October 28, 2008

Cloud Computing

A crackin' good read from Amrit Williams on a topic close to our hearts!

http://techbuddha.wordpress.com/2008/10/26/cloud-computing-the-good-the-bad-and-the-cloudy/

And on the second day God said “let there be computing - in the cloud” and he gave unto man cloud computing…on the seventh day man said “hey, uhmm, dude where’s my data?”

Just say no...

no-clean-feed-stencil3

and a pretty accurate rant for good measure...

Thursday, October 23, 2008

Oyster

Nearly walked straight by this in a Melbourne lane today. It reminds me of so many things from my childhood/media, it's not funny.

sento

Saturday, August 30, 2008

Bacterial IT Security

Imagine if you will lots of people playing Will Wrights new game SPORE
http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/will_wright_makes_toys_that_make_worlds.html
. There is no common species to speak of. Everyone who plays uses
COTS(yes off the shelf :) but every organism looks, feels and acts
differently. Sure they move, amble, fly, walk, run, eat, shit,
procreate etc... however we now have many, many unique entities that
interact. They can all be affected by lack of water, food,
temperature, disease, but how exactly? What do we measure and what do
we focus on? Now lets go macro to micro.

How is any system sustainable? Is there a net gain or loss in
energy/entropy? Will it sort itself out if we just sit-back and wait
for certain breeds to die out? What is it that allows some to succeed
and others to become extinct. We don't need to measure *all* factors,
however perhaps just the successful candidates, and what defines
success? Success = survivability and adaptability?

Assume fluid/shifting environment thus mobile, morphing, modular,
ability to react, change, multiply, access to resources.

Erm, again a stream of consciousness... I think you see where I am
going. We fucked up in IT. We thought we were building pyramids and
fort knox's when in actual fact we needed flocks of birds and 'ships
of the desert'....

What is the longest surviving species and why? -> symbiotic virii?
reptiles? co-existant properties for good guys/bad guys?

Ranum: Will the future be more secure? It'll be just as insecure as it
possibly can, while still continuing to function. Just like it is
today.

OMFG-SPAM

I have to opt-out of corporate communication in Australia rather than opt-in, fair nuff'. I have already opted out of all Qantas UCE(Unsolicited Commercial Email) as stated in the junk mail I just received the other day. I will let it speak for itself. Corporates are out of control.




"Dear MR X,

We regularly send exciting offers and news via email. But sadly, we haven't been able to get them to you, because while we have your email address as xxxxxx@xxxxxxx.com.au you have not opted-in to receive any of our email communications."

So they send me physical junk mail... Pure and utter, MADNESS! OMFG!

Taking a leaf out of Wade's book, I have lodged a complaint here http://www.acma.gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_310369 but this might not work based upon a technicality/convergence?

Aside: Click on the screenshot for a somewhat better image, apologies about quality as was taken on camera phone in bad light.

More DNS jiggery!

So here is a brain-fart that prolly' needs cleaning up and is awaiting moderation on Kaminsky's site! Challenge-response mechanism basically. A DNS tunnelled type of CHAP for DNS.. and I know, I know, separate DNS server functions and all that... however ideas are ideas...

http://www.doxpara.com/?p=1237

"I’m afraid it’s always a computational cost or time trade-off. Essentially Penny Black project style challenge or LaBrea tarpitting is required.

What *DO* we own re: logical assets? RRs!!!!!

Could we ask the remote server somehow to lookup a temp record in our own domain, generate one(as we own our own servers hopefully) and then wait for the lookup from the remote NETBLOCK? Kinda like SMTP authentication for websites and mailing lists with an OTP. One would have to be in-path to know the variable or understand some characteristic of the remote network/domain.

Let’s use the attack in reverse to secure the attack? Use the attack to secure ourselves as we can generate an arbitrary RR in our own domain e.g. our resolver talks to our domain NS and tells it to inject a local variable/record… think of it as a magic number, assume the attacker is not in-path.. then force the remote domain to ask our domain about it, before they give us the original new query for a host… haven’t totally thought this through fully :) might be worse re: BW :(

Or maybe debounce but record “IP TTL” tolerance. Sure IP TTL’s can change with backbone routing updates but less likey in the course of lookups for random/new hosts not actually in local cache already.

Firewalls or any policy point invalidates host based rate limiting somewhat."

Thursday, August 21, 2008

Request for flows

Problem Statement/Overview of Initiative:

- information has value though it is subjective to the possessor and the dispersion/dilution of instances of said data
- data at rest and data in motion have differing utilities/values
- shared infrastructures are often abstracted or ignored when in actual fact their intrinsic and aggregate value is a multiple of any individual member system or atomic piece of data
- organisations do not share security or incident data due to perceived reputational issues
- security posture and security spend is predicated upon real/percevied value of presence/absence of data/information but not upon complete systems/networks, fabrics or reachability to said data
- to generate even an interim or arbitrary currency of data value, context of data both at rest and in motion must me known
- fabrics provide connectivity, utility, and add-value services to endpoint/virtual nodes
- foundational values and attributes must be quantified for shared infrastructures/fabrics as a pre-requisite to factoring value of endpoint systems and subsequently data -> otherwise all value propositions are independent, incorrect and removed from their actual interdependency and 'real' cost
- once the concept of value can be assigned to classifications of infrastructure nodes based primarily upon their importance/utility, subsequent paths/flows and interdependencies may be weighted and valued (for example similar to metrics used for routing algorithms at a link, distance metric etc)

- *no large flow datasets are available to the security/network community (as per logs to dshield.org etc) with the exception of the Arbor ATLAS project from which primarily only Arbor benefit directly for such types of research.

Proposition:

To generate metrics for different classifications of nodes based upon a simple taxonomy of flows and weighted relationships to infrastructure services. (also utilising reachability/relationships with numbers of endpoints over time). Reachable endpoints/IPs may be virtual interfaces or physical interfaces and also may be subsets of greater nodes such as clusters/load balancers/virtual endpoints(EHV) etc.

Sample datasets of netflow/IPFIX data are required from a range of organisations over as long a time period as possible. Anonymisation will be applied to protect the innocent.

The author hopes to research the contextual relationships between nodes in an organisation and to weight and attribute value to flows in the hope of arriving at something akin to the ramble @ http://bsdosx.blogspot.com/2006/06/byo-rfc.html , also perhaps using a derivative of 'metcalfes law' based upon reachable/live endpoints to generate a 'total' value of the fabric and services to the business or organisation.

Tuesday, August 19, 2008

Buller08..Snowboarding

A video encoding education! Hope you enjoy, the music is fun!



If you want a really good quality stream click here and select the "Watch in High Quality" link under the "Views" keyword!

Tuesday, August 12, 2008

Enterprise Management and Provisioning

Virtualisation of interfaces between systems and entities will actually provide more robust and persistent characteristics of nodes and resources. It will also allow for dynamic and non-disruptive "adds, moves and changes", but will be a troubleshooting nightmare whereupon convergence of skills and depth of code shall introduce more complexity. A new paradigm of defensible, self monitoring and self diagnosing code will be required. I also believe we need a virtual internet for testing, but that's going to be the next big thing! Donal.




Note:
EHV = End Host Virtualiser
NPV/NPIV = N_Port Virtualisation / N_Port Identifier Virtualisation

This is a pretty good overview on "The Evolving Data Center from Cisco':
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns340/ns517/ns224/ns783/white_paper_c11-473501.html

Friday, August 08, 2008

Google "You can make money without doing evil." ?
Google acquires Postini.
Postini pass traffic to or route through the US ARMY domestic spying ring INSCOM.
My GMAIL account is blocked when trying to send to a mailing list in the US which discusses security metrics.

Details in previous post. 'NGILBEVSMB002CL.il.ng.ds.army.mil' is effectively re-routing and blocking my emails.

Wired story on AT&T splitting backbone fibres: http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/05/70908

Sunday, August 03, 2008

Service transparency needed in Oz too

”The blunt means was referring to how some Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) platforms manage traffic when placed out of line. If a device is out of line, the only way to control traffic is to directly or indirectly signal the sender to slow down or terminate the communication session.”
“Consumers must be fully informed about the exact nature of the service they are purchasing and any potential limitations associated with that service.”


http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2008/08/lessons-learned-from-the-fcc-decision/

Friday, August 01, 2008

SF-SJ-SF-SFA

So I'm sitting in San Fran International terminal awaiting my flight to Melbourne via Auckland and reflecting on some fun stuff in the USENIX Security Symposium in San Jose I just attended(more specifically a special part of the conference on Security Metrics called Metricon):

a) SF Airport is at "Department of Homeland Security Threat Level ORANGE", who gives a sweet flying f**k.. and what does that mean anyway? Security traffic lights 'go slow' perhaps?
b) My GMAIL (web based email obviously.. AJAX'y port 80) to my securitymetrics.org group didn't get through from either the hotel's wireless nor the free wireless at the conference as the military have me blocked as a 'prohibited sender'... cool huh? Must be that email I sent a while back with as many keywords as possible in it. Nice one Draz! Anyway, see below for more details re: SMTP headers (I'm hoping it's not a redirect or filter by the hosting company of securitymetrics.org but I'm not sure yet) (NGILBEVSMB002CL.il.ng.ds.army.mil is in there somewhere...)
c) Spent an hour listening to the radio in San Fran today whereby a liberal radio station was interviewing Vincent Bugliosi, author of 'The Prosecution of George W. Bush for Murder', which is being blacklisted as such by the weak-ass delusional US media. Rock on Vince... he wants the death penalty for Bush + cronies. The fact that he carries such weight in terms of his background and history is one reason the mainstream invertebrates in the media are side stepping the gent.
d) met some cool amurican Lockheed Martin R&D dudes at the conference, including some peeps from Darpa, CIS(Center for Internet Security) and security bloggers I follow.
e) Met Dan Geer. Mission accomplished. Met Andrew Jaquaith who was like 'ahhhh Donal'..when he saw my name badge.
f) conference was pretty weak on the ground in terms of actual content but I didn't really care as I was just there for a holiday and to say hello to some peeps.
g) ebay security chick was cute, bigfix security chick looked like my mate micanders missus Holly
h) I came up with the idea of temporarily revoking NETBLOCKS as a punitative measure for orgs on the internets
i) Myself and Russell hit the bars twice chasing Asian-American chicks and had our fair share of Coronas and Mojitos, interesting discussions, great food, phone numbers, but didn't seal the deal. What's the story again with 2am closing?
j) I was reminded of the mass delusional insular conscious state most Amuricans live in
k) I was reminded of the smell of 'sewage' that wafts in certain areas of SF, including the abundance of homeless peeps around certain neighbourhoods.
l) I was pleased to see randomers walking around Haight-Ashbury in home made super hero capes, some in wizard hats... ain't it great that I wasn't phased nor were most of the public..
m) I was reminded how beatiful parts of California are and how cool and cooky SF still is.
n) I didn't get to the Green Gulch Zen Center, maybe next time! I seem to have ended up in San Fran every 1.5 to 2 years since around 1998-1999

What follows are the SMTP headers from the f**'ing dopy military, almost like they want to expose their internal MTA's....

Delivered-To: irldexter@gmail.com
Received: by 10.110.39.19 with SMTP id m19cs75264tim;
Tue, 29 Jul 2008 16:29:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by 10.100.41.1 with SMTP id o1mr11435736ano.10.1217374144604;
Tue, 29 Jul 2008 16:29:04 -0700 (PDT)
Return-Path:
Received: from mail06.ng.army.mil (mail14.ng.army.mil [132.79.8.26])
by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 6si327532yxg.6.2008.07.29.16.29.03;
Tue, 29 Jul 2008 16:29:04 -0700 (PDT)
Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of IL-ExchangeService@ng.army.mil designates 132.79.8.26 as permitted sender) client-ip=132.79.8.26;
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of IL-ExchangeService@ng.army.mil designates 132.79.8.26 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=IL-ExchangeService@ng.army.mil
Received: from mail06.ng.army.mil (unknown [127.0.0.1])
by mail06.ng.army.mil (Symantec Mail Security) with ESMTP id 9D2A4520007
for ; Tue, 29 Jul 2008 18:23:31 -0500 (CDT)
X-AuditID: 844f0819-ac13fbb000001122-9a-488fa673712f
Received: from NGIAFESTBH002.ng.ds.army.mil (unknown [132.79.8.28])
by mail06.ng.army.mil (ARNG Mail Security Out) with ESMTP id 880194DC002
for ; Tue, 29 Jul 2008 18:23:31 -0500 (CDT)
Received: from NGILFESTBH002.il.ng.ds.army.mil ([55.70.177.222]) by NGIAFESTBH002.ng.ds.army.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959);
Tue, 29 Jul 2008 18:29:02 -0500
Received: from NGILBEVSMB002CL.il.ng.ds.army.mil ([55.70.177.218]) by NGILFESTBH002.il.ng.ds.army.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959);
Tue, 29 Jul 2008 18:29:01 -0500
Received: from mail pickup service by NGILBEVSMB002CL.il.ng.ds.army.mil with Microsoft SMTPSVC;
Tue, 29 Jul 2008 18:29:01 -0500
thread-index: Acjx0uGiIpV20940QBOD9qKfljCyIw==
Thread-Topic: Symantec Mail Security detected a prohibited sender in a message sent (SYM:07622397080654417781)
From:
To:
Subject: Symantec Mail Security detected a prohibited sender in a message sent (SYM:07622397080654417781)
Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2008 18:29:01 -0500
Message-ID: <45678D748EE142BB9E065FE101891564@il.ng.ds.army.mil>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="utf-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Mailer: Microsoft CDO for Exchange 2000
Content-Class: urn:content-classes:message
Importance: normal
Priority: normal
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.3790.4133
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 29 Jul 2008 23:29:01.0304 (UTC) FILETIME=[E1C17F80:01C8F1D2]
X-Brightmail-Tracker: AAAAAA==

Subject of the message: Re: [securitymetrics] Security awareness metrics
Recipient of the message: "Imran Mushtaq" ;"discuss@securitymetrics.org"

v6 thing-a-me-bobs

So Kevin Kelly follows the 'Internet of Things' and Kurzweil's predictions.

Wednesday, July 30, 2008

Future Shock Security 2.0

Utility / Cloud computing will not take over, but drive price comparison in internal IT shops. Atomic metrics must have abstract units convertible to associated costs perhaps in a financial market like brokered environment.

It is nuts. It is scary. Breeding out the 'old guard' wil happen also, as currently security is also a social and geo-political problem. Incentives and penalties will need to be introduced, initially per country. Once RIRs get fully authoritative and sBGP, DNSSEC happens, we may look at penalising entities! Virtual hosts, virtual servers, virtual networks and virtual storage will also drive fluidity in IT yet increase the static nature and characteristics of 'virtual nodes' which transact with each other.

More: What if a *national* security board/organisation could instruct an RIR(Regional Internet Registry) based upon an IRR(Internet Routing Registry) recorded NETBLOCK to be revoked as punishment for X... e.g. sinkhole/null route at Tier1/2/3 ISP/INEX? Thus an organisation would lose it's internet presence. Maybe we could use this to force em' to supply their anonymized *logs* and *survey* data (signed by the CIO of course) ....

Thursday, June 12, 2008

P0wned

MCP(Management Control Plane)
CP(Control Plane)
DP(Data Plane)

...should all be separate or as near as, especially in Tier1/2/3 ISP, INEX etc...

however why not try...with a global botnet to BGP announce your local SRC address for all DNS root servers sequentially while including BGP malformed/exploits with decreasing TTLs from the hopcount down to the first layer 3 hop. Lather. Rinse . Repeat. (including multipathed repsonses)

Hmmmm.....

Sunday, June 08, 2008

Nanobioinfotechnology

Nothing to see here yet, move along. Just thinking out loud about convergence.

Friday, June 06, 2008

How do you teach a child that fire is hot?

How do you teach management and the 'old guard' of IT about router root kits?

How do you teach Mom and Pop about 'drive-by pharming'? (mine excluded :)

How do you teach kiddies that 'bad people' exist and 'bad things' should not be looked at on the internet without prematurely shattering their innocence or attempting to remove their access to the internet?

Well. You don't. Manage to the edge and offer a managed service. Remove default permit.

Sunday, June 01, 2008

Architecture by any other name

Physics and space-time compression in cyberspace? What is the cost model, fundamental units and atomic entities in IT and are they static? Would buildings or other structures look or be designed differently if they were intended to run software that inherently changed their function and application, or if they had to resist sentient attackers and unforeseen loads? Viva la revolution!

Architecture definition from the Oxford English Dictionary in OSX.
architecture |ˈärkiˌtek ch ər|
noun
1 the art or practice of designing and constructing buildings.
• the style in which a building is designed or constructed, esp. with regard to a specific period, place, or culture : Victorian architecture.
2 the complex or carefully designed structure of something : the chemical architecture of the human brain.
• the conceptual structure and logical organization of a computer or computer-based system : a client/server architecture


It isn't great practice to argue by analogy, but when the terminology inherent in a concept, system or discipline heavily borrows and indeed fragments an existing well defined discipline, it is hard not to use the fundamentals of the original discipline as a starting point. This post will focus on the relationship between information technology architecture and traditional architecture (though may be applied to biotech and nanotech in the future once the ubiquity of IT is also reached in these fields).

When the grey goo starts spreading it will be too late to fire the "architect".

Two things to remember throughout this post a) the fact that traditional architects must be licensed in most countries and are held accountable and responsible for what they produce and how and b) materials science does not accelerate at the pace that information technology does.

Rather than re-invent the wheel let's look at the traditional field of the roles of architects and structural engineers: http://www.helium.com/items/1028268-senior-school-heard-terms

"1 - Architects are generally responsible for design of buildings used primarily for everyday use by people. Structural engineers are responsible for design of a wide range of structures, such as bridges and power plants, for which an architect is not usually involved.

2 - Architects are responsible for design of the building shape, layout and appearance. Structural engineers are responsible for design of the building elements (foundations, columns, beams) that support all other building elements.

3 - In general, the results of architecture are visible when the building is completed. In general, the results of engineering for buildings are not visible after construction.

4 - When the owner hires an architect, the architect manages the overall design process. For buildings, structural engineers most often works for the architect. In general, the architect defines parameters (criteria) that the structural engineer must use for design of the structural elements.

5 - The structural engineer uses relatively complex mathematics and computer software for design. The architect uses graphical techniques primarily, along with basic math. "

From: http://www.boxesandarrows.com/view/enterprise
"Having IT, business analysts, and subject matter experts involved is important and necessary, but none of those three groups understands information and knowledge at a sufficiently deep level to offer truly creative and innovative alternatives that make information and knowledge systems work across the whole enterprise."

And a comment from Trilochan Chhaya in response to a related post http://archnet.org/forum/view.jsp?message_id=201 :

"Information and Technology.........
Knowledge and Architecture.........
Information and Technology have existed for ages,and have challenged the Creativity of the Humans all the time.

Fortunately, it needs a creative thought to change Information to Knowledge and Technology to Architecture."

Let me get back to this one as I ran out of time. But if you are in any way IT inclined, you probably know where I am going already... and as an aside,

Combine "internet 0", with nanotech/nanofabrication... yes there is indeed "Plenty of Room at the Bottom"

Tuesday, May 20, 2008

Time to return to Wing Chun chop foooey


"Man, I see in Fight Club the strongest and smartest men who've ever lived.
I see all this potential, and I see it squandered.
God damn it, an entire generation pumping gas, waiting tables; slaves with white collars.
Advertising has us chasing cars and clothes, working jobs we hate so we can buy shit we don't need.
We're the middle children of history, man.
No purpose or place.
We have no Great War.
No Great Depression.
Our Great War's a spiritual war... our Great Depression is our lives.
We've all been raised on television to believe that one day we'd all be millionaires, and movie gods, and rock stars.
But we won't.
And we're slowly learning that fact. And we're very, very pissed off."

Sunday, May 18, 2008

Wonderful... the science of happiness


I inherited my love of radio from my Dad.



I find myself switching on ABC Radio National everyday before any other station. On Saturday the 17th May 2008 I stumbled upon this gem. http://www.abc.net.au/rn/allinthemind/stories/2008/2243006.htm

"The pursuit of happiness is a global obsession. But can science investigate its slippery, subjective nature? What are the metrics—self report, brain activity, or the good deeds we do? Five world leaders in the field join Natasha Mitchell in conversation—neuroscientist Richard Davidson, Buddhist monk Matthieu Ricard, Buddhist scholar B. Alan Wallace, psychologist Daniel Gilbert and philosopher David Chalmers."

Considering I missed the end of the segment, the concept of podcasting reinforces itself in the spreading of enlightenment via information and ideas. A segue perhaps to this:

"To create a social business which reduces all suffering by facilitating the access to and dissemination of enlightened information and ideas."

Note: It's coming.

Tuesday, May 13, 2008

Something else is missing... need a pointer


Was thinking today... since school and university have come and gone(from my perspective), and family are in a different hemisphere; why is it so difficult to find or stumble across a mentor in this industry or even in this life? Is it just when you are younger that you feel like there are people around and above you who know what's going on, or have a plan? Once one becomes more self aware do we see everyone stumbling along together? One wonders what structure or guidance we as a society will need or will cling to to ensure cohesion, or what will emerge in the place of organised religions in the West?

Where are the few who espouse 'enlightened self-interest' and 'non-zero sum games' for the world? Why is it not immediately obvious in our leaders and politicians? What is broken and how can we fix it? ( I tend to start these days with http://www.ted.com/ or the http://www.worldchanging.com/book/ )

Unfortunately Information Technology is extremely lacking in individuals who can offer wisdom and guidance, presumably being such a young discipline/art itself?

Life is difficult to figure out in this generation of mass media with a constant bombardment of encoded information which mainly focuses on mass materialism and consumption. Is it any reason that graffiti and street art has tried to fill the gap left by the press, advertising and the media at large.

Everything has sped up. Most people are disembodied from themselves and society. What could you prescribe? Diet, exercise, preventative mental health, meditation, different types of education, emotional intelligence...etc?

If you would like to be a mentor please send a S.A.E. to PO BOX 564 :)

I probably need my own personal technical version of one of these guys: J Krishnamurti, Anthony DeMello, Eckhart Tolle, Matthieu Ricard... or maybe an aggregate avatar of all of them that follows you online or is a 3d hologram buddy in real life ;)


Note: The image above is of the 3d holographic shark who assists the kid in one of Discovery's 2057 programs. An episode that happens to focus on a city wide virus that gets in to everything including digital signage. Not on my shift I tells ya!

Monday, May 05, 2008

How much is enough?

Is IT Security/Technology Risk Management a discipline or an art, is it subjective or objective? ( Is information technology deterministic or just overly complex? )

Are IT systems and frameworks closed systems? What comparable frameworks or systems (through which value transits) must defend against sentient attackers who attempt to subvert, control or disable services?

Can organisations quantify the value of information in motion or at rest within their managed footprint? Can they independently verify/audit the flows and data objects present? Somehow the bad guys have a better appreciation for CPU, disk and BW and SERVICE than we have!

Does it come down to simple economics? How to incentivise and penalise?

Surely 'Critical Infrastructure' should be held to extremely high standards by an independent body of technical auditors?

Does it really come back to accountability? Do we/they/us/them need to get burned badly (which the miscreants don't want either!) before we are enlightened...

Can the little guys afford the head count of the big boys? (big boys who actually sometimes have *less* of a clue about their systems than the little guys in the first place!). Is it possible that sink-holing traffic centrally in the cloud will give us the visibility/control we have hoped for? Thin offices perhaps staffed with 'thin' people :)

For me it comes back to a simple paradigm. You can't manage what you can't measure. We need to return to atomic units via reductionist thought. This is what I hope shall come with cloud and utility computing. Can you or the cloud provider "afford" NON-integral CPU, DISK, FLOWS, BW, KILOWATTS... runaway code.. such that it now becomes a billing issue? Once IT shops in enterprises start properly implementing "charge-back" rather than a flat rate service we may see some changes.... this coupled with a metric/cost applicable to shared infrastructure such as network fabrics, DNS, NTP, control planes etc...

How can we secure a service when we can't even charge for a service?

Billing 2.0, Utility 2.0, Employment 2.0

Saturday, May 03, 2008

"Toffler-esque", wondering about IT churn?

An interesting look at employee churn, and very apt in the IT arena, methinks:

"Employees – especially the most talented ones – are not “dating around” and moving from place to place in search of the Perfect Company at which they can grow old and retire at. They’ve already aced the first four rungs of Maslow’s hierarchy and are in search of self-actualization: the instinctual need of humans to make the most of their abilities and to strive to be the best they can."

http://thedailywtf.com/Articles/Up-or-Out-Solving-the-IT-Turnover-Crisis.aspx

Thanks Wade. All we have to worry about now is the predictions of Malthus.

Wednesday, April 30, 2008

Phrase of the day...

Reading away in some offical blueprint documents for a client ..... came across the phrase "opportunistic use of automation"... tee hee.

Definition of opportunistic from my Mac's 'Dictionary and Thesaurus':

opportunistic |ˌäpərt(y)oōˈnistik|
adjective

exploiting chances offered by immediate circumstances without reference to a general plan or moral principle : the change was cynical and opportiunistic.

Tuesday, April 15, 2008

Internet Infrastructure Report from Arbor


Nearly forgot to read/listen to this this year. Sound ain't great, would have expected more from the guys, however the content is worth a listen or the report a read.

PDF below:
http://www.arbornetworks.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1034&Itemid=525

Monday, April 14, 2008

Screwing with perception.. quality

So basically time stops and challenges peoples perception of reality. Wonderful really.

Friday, April 11, 2008

Microsoft end to end rebuttle, trust me

From: http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/twc/endtoendtrust/default.mspx
http://tinyurl.com/53psbo "Establishing_End_to_End_Trust.pdf"
The word transitive is not used once though hinted at. Let me preface the below rant with the fact that I don't have the answer(s). As pointed out in the article on Page 7: "As noted below, there are historic, economic, social, and political forces that suggest a well-constructed regime is better than none at all, especially in light of the challenges we face on the Internet and the desire of people to be more secure in their daily lives"... and "We must create an environment where reasonable and effective trust decisions can be made." Agreed.

However: ( Christ their lingo could do with some updating and accuracy though... read on... !)

Apparently sloppy code, the pace of technology, a bloated, incestuous, self-serving IT industry lacking in basic engineering discipline (around tolerances and expected usage) coupled with complexity, default permit, cost of massive parallel attacks, jurisdictional immunity.. yadda, yadda has *nothing* to do with our current predicament.... it's *all* about end-to-end trust... hmm subjective or objective guys? I'm hoping end-to-end includes dependencies relating from transitive trust...

Apparently though "Experience shows that most cybercriminal schemes are successful because people, machines, software, and data are not well authenticated and this fact, combined with the lack of auditing and traceability, means that criminals will neither be deterred at the outset nor held accountable after the fact. Thus the answer must lie in better authentication that allows a fundamentally more trustworthy Internet and audit that introduces real accountability"

Page 4 "But staying the current course will not be sufficient; the real issue is that the current strategy does not address effectively the most important issue: a globally connected, anonymous, untraceable Internet with rich targets is a magnet for criminal activity—criminal activity that is undeterred due to a lack of accountability.".... hmmmm yeah but what about http://geer.tinho.net/ieee.geer.0606.pdf

Geer:"Everything about digital security
has time constants that are three or-
ders of magnitude different from the
time constants of physical security:
break into my computer in 500 mil-
liseconds but into my house in 5 to
10 minutes."

Geer:"Human-scale time and rate con-
stants underlie the law enforcement
model of security. The crime happens
and the wheels of detection, analysis,
pursuit, apprehension, jurisprudence,
and, perhaps, penal servitude then,
paraphrasing Longfellow, “grind
slowly, yet they grind exceeding
fine.” In other words, law enforce-
ment generally has all the time in
the world, and its opponent, the
criminal, thus must commit the
perfect crime to cleanly profit from
that crime."

Geer:"If the physics of digital space and
digital time mean we ally ourselves
with the intelligence world view
and not the law enforcement world
view, we have to ask ourselves two
things: is the price of digital sur-
veillance a bearable price for the
benefit of digital safety? And, if so,
what is the unit of digital surveil-
lance? What do we watch—people
or bits?"

Back to Microsoft:Establishing_End_to_End_Trust:..

Page 8: Mis-use of the word hacker "external hackers with access to their systems, in large part because a hacker ".. will they ever learn or at least work harder for a little respect? Apparently "device-to-device authentication" will foil the "hackers"... and scripting attacks facilitates "thus making anyone an “expert” hacker; and the amount of data that can be stolen is limited only by bandwidth. "(Page 10)

Page 8: "robust management tools" are predicated on trusted management tools and one would hope them to be robust to begin with :)

Page 8: "depending on the threat level" , define threat and what metric is employed to address the level?

Page 8: "flooding and probing attacks"... is probing an attack?

Page 8: "Autonomous defense would be possible if, for example, packets likely to be malicious (because they are reliably identified as coming from a dangerous source) could be dropped shortly after entering the network or at a computer’s interface to the network." erm, a self-defending network by virtue of a firewall?

Page 8: "Even the intractable insider threat could be more successfully addressed because better audit tools would make it easier to identify suspicious access patterns for employees in a timely manner." ok so this is anomaly detection now via trust?

Page 8: "The authentication of identity, device (and its state), software, and data could be used to generate trust measurements that could also be used to reduce risk to the ecosystem." don't get me started although 'trusting the state' is a good concept, trust measurements spins me out considering 'trust' is somewhat boolean or a nominal measurement :)

Page 8: Apparently "one of the reasons that large enterprises manage risk relatively well is that they have dedicated IT staff implementing risk management programs." hmmmmm.... so throw some people at the issue and get the job done 'relatively' well :)

Page 8: Here comes the NAP pitch "Yet there is no chief information officer for the public, and no mechanism for protecting the broader Internet by taking best practices from enterprises, such as Network Access Protection, and applying those practices to the public." What about FIRST, NSP-SEC, Arbor, Internet Motion Sensor, Network Telescopes and ISPs in general? Ummm... NIST? SANS? Sorry guys Net Neutraliy vs extreme ISP Hostility with NAP?.. the oul' internet would break methinks... erm... we don't all conform on the endpoints ladies and gents, good luck on that one... the internet is a superorganism that is evolving its immune system. Surveillance and telemetry is the first step.

Page 8: We can fix it all "With better authentication and audit, dynamic trust decisions could be made (based upon, for example, the state of a machine) and Internet service providers could use network access controls to limit the activities of “untrustworthy” machines until they were updated."

So Internet wide NAC/NAP is the answer, don't let the "bad guys" or "bad nodes" on in the first place and kick em' off if they're bad(tm)

Page 9: Hmm, "Second, absent the ability to identify and prove the source of misconduct, there can be no effective deterrent—no effective law enforcement response to cybercrime and no meaningful political response to address international issues relating to cyberabuse." true.

Page 10: "Because all software operates in an environment defined by hardware, it is critical to root trust in hardware." hmmmmmm "If machines did a machine-to-machine-based authentication rooted in TPM keys before allowing a network connection, then one could arguably exclude unapproved machines from accessing network resources. Using new cryptographic techniques, this can be done in privacy-compliant ways." hmmmm cold boot?

Page 14 states: "As the firewall continues to diminish in importance, it is important to focus on protecting data as opposed to simply protecting the machines that store such data." Not sure I'd use this phrase rather that the focus from all sides is moving up the stack, but by no means obviating the need for firewalling.

Page 15: "standardizing audit data formats and tools".. erm syslog? http://www.loganalysis.org/sections/standards/index.html

Page 15: "one can call or send mail to millions of victims, but the time and cost makes this infeasible. " ye think? yeah SPAM is really on the decline, NOT! Micrsofts Penny Black project made sense though... http://research.microsoft.com/research/sv/PennyBlack/

Ok at this point I give up or this will get too long..... the whole section on F.Audit Page 14/15 is purile and so far behind the times it's scary... they need to look outside of their Microsoft shaped box in Redmond.

No mention of the network.

As Ranum states on http://www.beastorbuddha.com/ "The Internet applications stack depends heavily on ARP and DNS and those protocols depend on a tamper-free network. It’s just silly to think your end-point can secure itself if the network fabric is untrustworthy! If the network is untrustworthy, it’s “game over, man!” as Private Hudson would say."

At the end of the piece a question is posed "can we maintain a globally connected, anonymous, untraceable Internet and be dependent on devices that run arbitrary code of unknown provenance?"... Apparently if the answer is no, then " we need to create a more authenticated and audited Internet environment"... DOH!

"it is important to address all of the complicated social, political, economic, and technical issues raised to ensure we end up with the Internet we want, one which empowers individuals and businesses, and at the same time protects the social values we cherish. " Agreed but which *we* is that? And do we want backwards compatibility?

Thursday, April 10, 2008

Counterpoint to the generational divide...

So my Mum sends me this email. She was only introduced to the Internet in 2000.

"I suspected something was running in the background. And fssm32.exe was quoting 92-95 under CPU usage. I googled "fssm32.exe and CPU usage" and found this:

http://www.geekstogo.com/forum/fssm32-exe-taking-all-CPU-resolved-t5718.html

which was exactly my problem. I had had an error message from F-Secure saying it
couldn't connect to update. I updated it manually, after a few tries, and ran a
scan.

It told me I had two trojan keyloggers, and listed them in the TIF but said it
couldn't delete. But they didn't show up under my identity. I found them under
the Admin identity, and deleted them. But of course when I rebooted and ran a
scan, they were back, only this time in a .dbx of the administrator. The
Phishing Email folder. So I deleted both .dbx (me and the admin, who are the
same person) cos I knew new folders would be recreated in Outlook. Then I ran
"Window Washer" with "bleach" (which means it overwrites files three times) and
included 'free space', as well as TIF and the rest ... Then rebooted and ran
F-Secure again.

When F-Secure said I was clean, I confirmed it with two online scans --
TrendMicro and Panda. The sluggishness has disappeared. And CPU for fssm32.exe
is now saying 02 or 03 when I have only Outlook open. I'm *assuming* for now
that if there were any files still in registry, that F-Secure should be telling
me. Maybe I shouldn't assume.

On the F-Secure info page about the type of trojan, it said I'd better change
all my passwords when I was sure I was clean.

I have "HijackThis" but am nervous of using it without guidance.

The problem *seems* to be related to Windows Automatic Updates. I'm set to
Automatic, but when I checked last night, it downloaded 9 Updates, which was a
shock. No idea at all how that happened. I'm still set to Automatic Updates."

Noice huh?

Tuesday, April 08, 2008

Sentence of the day, even if I do say...

To a colleague today about IT security and information assurance.

"theory" looking for visionary leadership in a world gone sour with an inverted pyramidal house of cards being built on yet smaller physical footrprints with sedimentary protocols forming ingrained foundations whereupon we dance with virtualisation in expanded cyberspace with even less capacity for visibility and management, let alone surveillance and optimsation. L2/L3/L2 -> Ethernet/IP-MPLS/VPLS... ESX/VSwitch/Windows = layers of complexity, layers of code, and yet fully fledged OS's pushed further away from the networking stack... abstracted in to inner space.....