Google RTFM screencast:
http://letmegooglethatforyou.com/?q=advanced+google+search+tips
Thursday, November 20, 2008
Tuesday, November 18, 2008
Arrogance of obfuscation.
http://spittoon.23andme.com/2008/08/29/labs-remove-genetic-data-from-public-databases-after-forensic-breakthrough/#more-1174
"a new statistical method that can establish the presence of a single
individual's genetic signature in a sample containing DNA from
hundreds of different people."
"It was previously assumed that aggregating the data of hundreds or
even thousands of people — essentially giving the overall genetic
composition of the group as a whole — would make it impossible to
identify any one person in it."
"Hypothetical scenarios aside, it is highly unlikely that any person
has ever actually been picked out of an aggregate database, and not
just because the mathematics of the new method are so complex."
I sometimes worry more about DNA being 'stored' and derivitive
contextual information and the associated information security thereof
rather than any credit card data etc. This is prompted by a great new
service https://www.23andme.com/
In the future when a genomic representation of me can be anywhere and
stored in multiple locations, how do I asert that I am me.
The biometric system *must* be ensured to be localised and not
connected to any other networks... erm a bit like SCADA systems I hear
you say? Will we need an X point check system.. something I have,
know, macro am, micro am, quantum am, how Y is done/performed, how Z
is done/performed, how K is done/performed..
Fun: I spoke before about nanobots, I now present "nano-identbots"
which are like mayflies i.e. they die once they identify a host and
have a localised PGP relationship with the system with which identify
is supposed to be represented to. They generate keys on birth and
immediately go out to identify the subject etc...
"a new statistical method that can establish the presence of a single
individual's genetic signature in a sample containing DNA from
hundreds of different people."
"It was previously assumed that aggregating the data of hundreds or
even thousands of people — essentially giving the overall genetic
composition of the group as a whole — would make it impossible to
identify any one person in it."
"Hypothetical scenarios aside, it is highly unlikely that any person
has ever actually been picked out of an aggregate database, and not
just because the mathematics of the new method are so complex."
I sometimes worry more about DNA being 'stored' and derivitive
contextual information and the associated information security thereof
rather than any credit card data etc. This is prompted by a great new
service https://www.23andme.com/
In the future when a genomic representation of me can be anywhere and
stored in multiple locations, how do I asert that I am me.
The biometric system *must* be ensured to be localised and not
connected to any other networks... erm a bit like SCADA systems I hear
you say? Will we need an X point check system.. something I have,
know, macro am, micro am, quantum am, how Y is done/performed, how Z
is done/performed, how K is done/performed..
Fun: I spoke before about nanobots, I now present "nano-identbots"
which are like mayflies i.e. they die once they identify a host and
have a localised PGP relationship with the system with which identify
is supposed to be represented to. They generate keys on birth and
immediately go out to identify the subject etc...
Strategy and IT Architecture
Greenfields accommodates top down thinking.
Legacy constraints force the dichotomoy of top down and bottom up, for the devil is in the detail!
Legacy constraints force the dichotomoy of top down and bottom up, for the devil is in the detail!
Monday, November 10, 2008
Thursday, November 06, 2008
Had to re-post this. I love it.
This is very like Open University or BBC2 programs for schools. Wonderful sardonic stuff!
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